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INJUNCTIONS ENJOINED; REMEDIES
RESTRUCTURED
Lily Limt & Sarah E. Craventt
Abstract
One of the foundational intellectual property rights in the
proverbial "bundle of sticks" granted by the United States patent
system to a patentee is the patentee's right to exclude others from
practicing his or her patented invention. The Supreme Court's
decision in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006),
and the Federal Circuit's decision in Kyocera Wireless Corp. v.
International Trade Commission, 545 F.3d 1340 (Fed Cir. 2008),
have shortened those sticks. This article tracks the impacts those two
decisions have on cases in the district courts and in investigations in
the International Trade Commission, including a decrease in the rate
of injunctions issued against parties found to infringe patents and an
increasing likelihood of patentees being required to accept
compulsory-like-licenses as their only remedy for infringement. In
addition, this article examines the disparate impact the cases have on
patentees that are in direct competition with the accused infringers
versus patentees that are non-practicing entities (NPE).
I. INTRODUCTION
Since its founding, this country has recognized a patent holder's
right to exclude.' By recognizing this right, the Founders sought to
promote innovation, a goal desired by all. One would think, therefore,
that the courts would strongly support patent rights, as the United
States' economy depends upon innovation. Yet surprisingly, the
t Lily Lim is a partner at Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett and Dunner LLP. Her
practice includes representing clients in intellectual property matters in district court, the ITC,
and at the Federal Circuit. She is a former law clerk to Senior Judge S. Jay Player of the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals.
tt Sarah E. Craven is an associate at Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett and
Dunner LLP. Prior to obtaining a J.D. with distinction from Stanford Law School in 2008, she
received a Ph.D. in Neuroscience and was a practicing scientist.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries").
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courts have been reducing the available remedies for patent
infringement, making it more difficult for patentees to obtain
injunctions. In eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L. C.,2 the Supreme
Court eliminated the two-decade-old sanctioned practice of granting a
permanent injunction against patent infringement after a finding of
infringement, absent extraordinary circumstances. 3 As a result, district
courts have severely reduced the rate at which they grant permanent
injunctions. In the International Trade Commission, another forum
that used to all but guarantee patentees an injunction after a finding of
infringement, the Federal Circuit's decision in Kyocera Wireless
Corp. v. International Trade Commission4 has also raised the bar for
obtaining an injunction for a typical patentee. The practical result of
these two cases is that certain patentees who successfully proved
infringement of their patents cannot exclude the infringer from
practicing the invention.5 Essentially, courts grant a compulsory
license instead of an injunction. Some may view this as a fair result
for non-practicing entities (e.g., trolls), but this ignores that certain
bedrocks of innovation in this country (e.g., universities and small
inventors) are frequently non-practicing entities.
Section II of this article discusses the history and impact of eBay.
Section III focuses on the background and impact of Kyocera. In
Section IV, the article discusses the resulting compulsory-license-like
effect of these two decisions and their disparate impact on patentees
based upon who they seek to exclude, a direct competitor or a non-
practicing entity.
II. EBAY V. MERCEXCHANGE
A. A History of Injunctive Relief Before eBay
In eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the Supreme Court
practically eviscerated two decades of Federal Circuit precedent
granting permanent injunctive relief virtually every time a valid
patent was found to be infringed.6 The Supreme Court struck down
the Court of Appeal's "general rule" that the facts surrounding a
finding of patent infringement typically meet the equitable test for
2. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
3. Id. at391-94.
4. Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 545 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
5. Id. at 1345.
6. eBay, 547 U.S. 388.
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injunctive relief absent "exceptional circumstances."7 The Supreme
Court concluded that granting permanent injunctions almost
automatically upon a finding of infringement departed unjustifiably
from the historical practice of scrupulously applying the four-factor
equitable test applicable to all assessments of whether a complainant
is entitled to injunctive relief.8 Under the four-factor test, patentees,
like any other plaintiff seeking injunctive relief, must demonstrate (1)
that they have suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies
available at law (e.g., money damages) are inadequate to compensate
for the injury; (3) that the balance of the hardships warrants a remedy
in equity; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a
permanent injunction.9
1. Genesis of the four-factor equitable test
Injunctions trace their roots to Ancient Rome,' and made their
way to U.S. courts modeled after English courts in equity. From the
beginning, courts have refused to issue injunctions as a matter of
right.1" Rather, courts have long recognized the need for "caution,
deliberation, and sound discretion" in issuing such a powerful
remedy, limiting its application to the finding of great injury without
an "adequate or commensurate remedy in damages."'
12
The Supreme Court too has long recognized injunctive relief as a
powerful remedy and limited such relief to preventing irreparable
injuries that lack an adequate remedy at law. 13 Injunctive relief,
therefore, is not issued as a matter of course even for the violation of
a property right. 14 But rather, the Court has demanded the grant of
injunctive relief remain subject to equitable considerations, derived
from several hundred years of history, that seek to flexibly
accommodate competing private claims and the public interest in each
7. Id. at 393-94.
8. Id. at 391-92.
9. Id. at 391.
10. Ryan McLeod, Injunction Junction: Remembering the Proper Function and Form of
Equitable Relief in Trademark Law, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 13, at 8 (2006) (citing A. H.
J. GREENIDGE, THE LEGAL PROCEDURE OF CICERO'S TIME 210-27 (1971)).
11. Id. (citing FRANCIS HtLLIARD, THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS 16 (2d ed. 1869)).
12. Bonaparte v. Camden & A.R. Co., 3 F. Cas. 821, 827 (C.C.D. N.J. 1830) (No. 1,617).
13. See, e.g., Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453, 456 (1919). Cf Shyamkrishna
Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, and Automatic
Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 593, 639-40 (2008) (discussing the traditional test for
applying injunctive relief).
14. See City of Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 337-38
(1933).
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particular case.' 5  These equitable considerations have been
transformed into the modem four-factor test that the Supreme Court
applied in eBay.
2. Pre-eBay: Twenty years of injunctions granted absent
''exceptional circumstances"
The Supreme Court's eBay decision dismantled approximately
twenty years of Federal Circuit precedent. Since the 1980s, the
Federal Circuit has held that an injunction will issue when
infringement of a valid patent has been found, absent a sound reason,
or exceptional circumstances, for denying it. 16
Shortly after the creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982, the court
announced its general rule giving a patentee a near automatic
injunction for infringement.' 7 The Federal Circuit did not, however,
fashion its general rule outside the context of the historical equitable
factors well known to the court. 18 Rather, the Federal Circuit based its
rule on a presumption that the patentee suffered an irreparable harm
from the violation of the property right to exclude, a right that the
founding fathers sanctioned in the Constitution. 19 In Richardson v.
Suzuki Motor Co., the court explained that, "this presumption derives
in part from the finite term of the patent grant" and the irremediable
harm wrought on the patentee by the passage of time in litigation
during which the patent term is not suspended. 20 The court thus
ordered the lower court to enter appropriate injunctive relief in light
15. See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944).
16. Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246-47 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
("Infringement having been established, it is contrary to the laws of property, of which the
patent law partakes, to deny the patentee's right to exclude others from use of his property. 35
U.S.C. § 261. '[T]he right to exclude recognized in a patent is but the essence of the concept of
property.' It is the general rule that an injunction will issue when infringement has been
adjudged, absent a sound reason for denying it."') (citations omitted); see also MercExchange,
L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
17. See W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1281 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
18. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 865-67 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
superseded by statute, 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006), as recognized in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic,
Inc., 872 F.2d 402 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
19. Richardson, 868 F.2d at 1247 (citing Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d
1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). The Federal Circuit has applied this same presumption in the
context of preliminary injunctions once the patentee established a likelihood of success on the
merits. See H.H. Robertson, Co. v. United Steel Deck, Inc., 820 F.2d 384, 390 (Fed. Cir. 1987),
abrogated on other grounds by Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir.
1995).
20. Richardson, 868 F.2d at 1247 (quoting H.H. Robertson, Co., 820 F.2d 384).
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of the accused infringer's failure to present a "sound reason" for
denying such relief.
21
Under the Federal Circuit's application of the four-factor test,
patentees were all but assured the coercive force of an injunction as
an infringer had little hope of establishing a sound reason for denying
injunctive relief. To provide the court with a sound reason to deny an
injunction, the infringer had to claim that the patentee had failed to
practice the patented invention and thereby frustrated an important
public need for the invention.22 For example, the Federal Circuit
denied injunctive relief when such relief would deprive the public of a
medical test kit for cancer,23 sewage treatment,24 and vitamin
fortification. Injunctive relief was also denied in other
circumstances, such as where laches applied or where there existed
too many complexities to determine possible future infringing
activities.26
In the context of preliminary injunctions, the Federal Circuit has
provided additional (and more achievable) factors sufficient to
overcome the presumption of irreparable harm for the denial of
injunctive relief. These include whether the infringer ceased
infringing activities, whether the patentee delayed in bringing suit,
and whether the patentee granted licenses in the past so that damages
would provide an adequate remedy for the invasion of the patent
right.27 Because the analysis for preliminary injunctions differs from
that for permanent injunctions, it is unclear whether eBay applies to
preliminary injunctions.28
21. Id. at 1246-47.
22. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing
Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995)), vacated, 547 U.S. 388
(2006).
23. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1547 (citing Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001
(C.D. Cal. 1987), aff'd, 849 F.2d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
24. Id. at 1548 (citing City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577 (7th Cir.
1934)).
25. Id. (citing Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 146 F.2d
941 (9th Cir. 1945)).
26. Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(affirming denial of a permanent injunction when the complexities of determining future
infringing activity precluded the court from drafting a narrowly tailored order); Odetics, Inc. v.
Storage Tech. Corp., 185 F.3d 1259, 1272-74 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (affirming denial of a permanent
injunction on pre-complaint products when laches applied).
27. See Polymer Techs., Inc. v. Bridwell, 103 F.3d 970, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
28. See Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Preliminary Injunctions After eBay v.
MercExchange, 240 N.Y. L.J. 3, 8 (2008); Caroline A. H. Sayers, Patents: Will eBay's
Rationale Be Applied to Preliminary Injunctions? 19 PRAC. LITIGATOR 45, 47-48 (2008). The
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3. Pre-eBay: Wielding the injunction threat
The pre-eBay threat of a near automatic injunction gave a
patentee a very powerful bargaining chip in licensing and settlement
negotiations. The Federal Circuit simply viewed this coercive power
as an inherent part of the value of the patent grant: "If the injunction
gives the patentee additional leverage in licensing, that is a natural
consequence of the right to exclude and not an inappropriate reward
to a party that does not intend to compete in the marketplace with
potential infringers. '29
Others have not viewed it so favorably, 30 especially when the
threat is wielded by a patent troll, or non-practicing entity (NPE).3 1
The headline-grabbing story of NTP and its patent infringement suit
against Research in Motion (RIM), maker of the wireless email
BlackBerry device, highlighted the power of injunctive relief to
generate large settlements. In the pre-eBay era ,NTP, a patent holding
company, succeeded in extracting a $612.5 million settlement from
RIM to prevent the BlackBerry devices of 3.2 million U.S. customers,
including White House staff and Congressmen, from going silent.
32
The dispute began in 2000 when NTP first approached RIM for
licensing fees based on the use of its patented wireless
communications systems and methods. When RIM refused, NTP filed
suit in the Eastern District of Virginia in November 2001, alleging
that various configurations of RIM's BlackBerry system infringed
over forty system and method claims from several of its patents.33 A
jury found NTP's patents valid and willfully infringed, and the judge
district court in MercExchange relied on Federal Circuit precedent in this context while denying
permanent injunctive relief both pre- and post-eBay. See MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc.,
500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 570-71 (E.D. Va. 2007); Mercexchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp.
2d 695, 712 (E.D. Va. 2003).
29. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
30. See, e.g., Foster v. Am. Mach. & Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1317, 1324 (2d Cir. 1974)
("[An injunction] is not intended as a club to be wielded by a patentee to enhance his negotiating
stance.").
31. See, e.g., Daniel J. McFeely, An Argument for Restricting the Patent Rights of Those
Who Misuse the U.S. Patent System to Earn Money Through Litigation, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 289,
297-98 (2008).
32. William R. Everding, "Heads-I-Win, Tails-You-Lose": The Predicament Legitimate
Small Entities Face Post eBay and the Essential Role of Willful Infringement in the Four-Factor
Permanent Injunction Analysis, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 189, 198-99 (2007); Susan Decker &
Rebecca Barr, BlackBerry Maker Pays Rival $612.5M To Settle Suit, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 4,
2006, at A9.
33. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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awarded NTP $53.7 million in damages and (importantly) a
permanent injunction, which was stayed pending appeal.34
The settlement figure during the parties' appeal to the Federal
Circuit reached $450 million, a modest number in hindsight.35 RIM,
however, failed to achieve a complete victory in the Federal Circuit,
which affirmed infringement of certain of NTP's system claims and
remanded the case back to the district court. 36 Also, RIM failed to
convince either the Supreme Court or the district court to allow time
for another look at NTP's patents: the Supreme Court denied RIM's
petition for a writ of certiorari,37 and the district court denied a motion
to stay the injunction pending a reexamination of the patent by the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).38 With time running out
and the permanent injunction looming large, even the U.S. Justice
Department became involved, filing a request for a ninety day stay to
compile a list of government workers whose email service should not
be cut off.
3 9
At the end of its legal rope, RIM settled with NTP for $612.5
million. And, while BlackBerry users throughout the United States
breathed a sigh of relief, commentators' attacks on NPEs for taxing
the U.S. economy continued with renewed vigor,40 especially as NTP
continued to sue other companies on the same patents even after the
USPTO rejected all of NPT's patent claims in its reexamination
proceedings due to substantial new questions of patentability.4 ' NTP
became the poster child for all the ills plaguing the U.S. patent
system.
The story, however, is not so black and white. NTP was not
started by a greedy villain, but by Thomas Campana Jr., an electrical
engineer, a small businessman, and an independent inventor.42 Like
many small inventors, lauded as the backbone of enterprise in this
34. Id. at 1292.
35. Kirk Teska, The Story Behind the BlackBerry Case, IEEE SPECTRUM ONLINE, March
2006, http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/mar06/3087.
36. NTP, 418 F.3d at 1325-26.
37. Research In Motion, Ltd. v. NTP, Inc., 546 U.S. 1157 (2006).
38. NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 2d 785, 788-89 (E.D. Va. 2005).
39. Yuki Noguchi, Government Enters Fray Over BlackBerry Patents, WASH. POST,
Nov. 12, 2005, at DI.
40. See, e.g., Editorial, Patently Absurd, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 2006, at A14.
41. See, e.g., NTP, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, No. 3:07-CV-548, 2007 WL 3254796,
at * I (E.D. Va. Nov. 2, 2007).
42. Aaron Homer, Whatever It Is... You Can Get It On eBay. . . Unless You Want .an
Injunction-How the Supreme Court and Patent Reform Are Shifting Licensing Negotiations
from the Conference Room to the Courtroom, 49 S. TEX. L. REv. 235, 244 (2007).
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country, Campana started his first business out of his basement.43 The
company provided wireless equipment to pager companies and grew
to thirty employees before folding.44 Campana, although out of
business, retained a large patent portfolio, and he teamed up with his
patent attorney to license the technology he had developed through
NTP. 45 But, similar to what many small inventors experience, large
companies simply ignored him. As another small inventor noted,
"only an infinitesimal percentage of small inventors can muster the
resources to defend their property .... So in 99 percent of cases, the
large companies get the IP for free. 46 RIM, however, did not get off
lightly. The very public NTP-RIM battle would come to echo in the
Supreme Court's eBay decision, and especially its aftermath. It would
come to ensure that other NTPs would not have the bargaining power
of an injunction behind their patent rights.
B. eBay: Strict Application of the Four-Factor Test
In May 2003, history seemed set to repeat itself. The NPE
MercExchange won a willful infringement verdict against online
retailer eBay for its fixed-priced sales over the internet.47 And while
the district court had denied MercExchange a permanent injunction,
the Federal Circuit reversed under its then general presumption of
irreparable harm absent exceptional circumstances and remanded the
case to the district court to enter injunctive relief.48 But unlike RIM,
the Supreme Court came to eBay's rescue, granting certiorari and
overruling the Federal Circuit's general rule.49
In denying injunctive relief to MercExchange in the first
instance, the district court had found the presumption of irreparable
harm rebutted by several factors. Specifically, the court found that the
plaintiffs obvious desire to license its patents, its lack of commercial
activity in practicing the patents, and its failure to seek a preliminary
injunction demonstrated a lack of irreparable harm.5" In so holding,
the court relied in part on the Federal Circuit's precedent in the
context of a preliminary injunction that the patentee's lack of
commercial activity is a significant factor in the calculus for
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Steve Seidenberg, Troll Control, 92 A.B.A. J., Sept. 2006, at 51.
47. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695 (E.D. Va. 2003).
48. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338-39 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
49. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
50. MercExchange, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 712.
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injunctive relief.51 The court also concluded that the issuance of
business-method patents to NPE's, like the one at issue, lent
significant weight against the imposition of an injunction because it
failed to serve the public interest.52
The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the district court had
abused its discretion in not awarding injunctive relief to
MercExchange whose patents had just been found valid and
infringed.53 The Court of Appeals found none of the factors
considered by the district court sufficiently exceptional to overcome
the presumption of irreparable harm and rejected the district court's
reasoning. The Federal Circuit disagreed that (1) the public's concern
over business-method patents; (2) the failure of the patentee to seek a
preliminary injunction; and (3) the patentee's failure to practice the
invention and willingness to license, supported denial of injunctive
relief.54 As to the third issue, the Federal Circuit stated:
Injunctions are not reserved for patentees who intend to practice
their patents, as opposed to those who choose to license. The
statutory right to exclude is equally available to both groups, and
the right to an adequate remedy to enforce that right should be
equally available to both as well.
55
The Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion overruled the
Federal Circuit's general rule that presumed irreparable harm for
infringement of a valid patent.56 Writing for the Court, Justice
Thomas explained that the historical four-factor equitable test for
permanent injunctions applies equally to the Patent Act as in other
contexts. 57 Citing the Court's precedent under other statutory schemes
where it had rejected categorical rules in favor of the four-factor test,
including the Copyright Act, the Court again concluded that it would
not imply into the Patent Act a major departure from the long
tradition of equity practice.58 The Court, therefore, rejected not only
the Federal Circuit's general rule that an injunction will issue absent
"extraordinary circumstances" but also the district court's apparent
adoption of the "expansive principle" that failure to practice the
51. Id. (citing High Tech Med. Instrumentation, Inc. v. New Image Indus., Inc., 49 F.3d
1551, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
52. Id. at 713-14.
53. MercExchange, 401 F.3d at 1339.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393-94 (2006).
57. Id. at391.
58. Id. at 391-93.
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invention and a willingness to license established the absence of
irreparable harm and thus precluded an injunction.59 In rejecting the
district court's reasoning, the Court pointed out that some patent
holders, such as university researchers or self-made inventors, might
legitimately prefer to license their patents and should not be
categorically precluded from satisfying the four-factor test.6° The
Justices expressed no opinion on the correctness of an injunction in
the case before them but vacated the Federal Circuit's decision for the
district court to apply the "new" standard in the first instance.61
Though the decision was unanimous, two concurring opinions
revealed an actual split in the Supreme Court's reasoning. First, Chief
Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia and Ginsburg, concurred
with the Court's opinion that the traditional four-factor test neither
entitles a patent holder to a permanent injunction nor justifies a
general rule that injunctions should automatically issue upon a finding
of infringement.62 But these three Justices went on to suggest that
applying the test would not result in a drastic reduction in the ability
of courts to issue such injunctions.63 The Chief Justice emphasized the
importance of history in the application of the equitable test, noting
that "[fjrom at least the early 19th century, courts have granted
injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement in the vast majority of
patent cases." 64 This long tradition of injunctive relief, Roberts wrote,
"is worth a volume of logic" as it reflects the difficulty in protecting
the patentee's right to exclude through monetary damages alone.65
In contrast, a concurrence by Justice Kennedy, with whom
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer joined, suggested quite the
opposite: application of the four-factor test should make injunctive
relief less available.66 Justice Kennedy emphasized that the right to
exclude remains distinct from the remedy and thus does not suggest
the inadequacy of monetary damages.67 Rather, the history of
injunctive relief reflects the economy of earlier times, and thus
history, while "instructive," should be considered in light of changed
59. Id. at 393-94.
60. Id. at 393.
61. Id. at 394.
62. Id. at 394-95 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
63. id.
64. Id. at 395.
65. Id. at 395 (quoting N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)).
66. Id. at 395-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 396.
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economic and patent conditions.68 Kennedy wrote that the outcome of
the four-fact test should be affected by the bargaining power of an
NPE to extract "exorbitant fees," especially when a patent covers only
a small component of a product.69 Under this formulation, a patentee
who does not practice his own invention is in fact less entitled to a
permanent injunction than one that does. Kennedy also latched on to
concerns over business-method patents, noting that the "potential
vagueness and suspect validity" of such patents also should play into
the four-factor test.
70
The eBay decision has been viewed as the Supreme Court's
response to the very public NTP-RIM BlackBerry patent feud.7 1 As
highlighted in Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, the opinion does
appear to reflect concerns over the emergence of business-method
patents and the rise of non-practicing, patent holding companies with
the power to hold-up market participants.72 A more benign view is
that the Court simply wished to bring the Federal Circuit in line with
the injunctive standard governing other cases.73 In light of the Court's
rejection of categorical rules for permanent injunctions in other
statutory contexts, the Court simply refused to allow the Federal
Circuit to create such a rule under the Patent Act.
The subsequent application of the four-fact test in the district
courts, however, seems to vindicate the first view as courts
immediately began to deny injunctions to NPEs. As discussed below,
the courts have created a new near categorical rule: if a patentee does
not practice the invention and is willing to grant licenses, an
injunction will not issue. Practicing patentees, however, have also
found themselves out of luck depending on how the court views the
relevant market for damages purposes. As such, rather than the
Federal Circuit's more equal treatment of patentees facing a violation
of their right to exclude, the result of eBay has been the creation of a
two-tier system of patent remedies based not on the value of the
patent but on the identity of the patentee.
68. Id. at 396-97.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 397.
71. See, e.g., Daniel Chavka, Patent Troll, http://blog.patents-tms.com/?p=238 (last
visited Jan. 6, 2009).
72. Rebecca A. Hand, eBay v. MercExchange: Looking at the Cause and Effect of a Shift
in the Standard for Issuing Patent Injunctions, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 461, 472, 474
(2007).
73. The Supreme Court took a similar course in the context of the standard for
declaratory judgment jurisdiction. See Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118
(2007).
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C. The Aftermath of eBay: A Two-Tier System of Remedies
Before eBay, courts granted patentees injunctions 95% of the
time after finding infringement.74 After eBay, this number has dipped
to 72%. 75 Whether a patentee and an accused infringer directly
compete in the marketplace has become the most significant factor
determining whether a court issues an injunction.76 Also of
significance in the new injunction calculus is (1) the patentee's
willingness to license; (2) the impact of the unauthorized sales on the
patentee's reputation, future profit, brand name; and (3) whether the
patent covers a component of limited importance to the total device.
Delay in bringing suit has also been considered.7  Perhaps
surprisingly, the willfulness of the infringement has not played a
significant role.78 The result is that a patentee who directly competes
in the marketplace with the infringing party gets an injunction 79.6%
of the time, while an NPE's chance of getting an injunction falls
precipitously to 33.3%.79
1. Injunctions for competitors only
A trio of district court decisions out of the Eastern District of
Texas post-eBay immediately established the importance of direct
competition in the marketplace for a patentee's entitlement to
74. Foley & Larder, Injunctive Relief after eBay v. MercExchange, Presentation to the
APLA 2007 Annual Patent Law Committee,
http://www.foley.com/files/tbls3 1Publications/FileUploadl 37/4541/lnjunctiveReliefAftereBay.
pdf. Another analysis of pre-eBay cases put the number at 84%. Robert M. Isackson, After
'eBay, 'Injunctions Decrease, 30 NAT'L L.J., Dec. 3, 2007 at SI.
75. FTI Consulting analysis of relevant publicly available court cases (collecting cases
between May 15, 2006, through October 22, 2008, with 73% granted (41) / 26% denied (15) /
1% undecided (1) for a total of 57 cases). (unpublished report, on file with author); since then
the undecided fell into the denial category.
76. See Foley & Larder, supra note 74.
77. Compare 800 Adept, Inc. v. Murex Sec., Ltd., 505 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1335-37 (M.D.
Fla. 2007) (finding delay in bringing suit of little significance), vacated on other grounds, 539
F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2008); TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Commc'ns Corp., 446 F. Supp. 2d 664, 670
(E.D. Tex. 2006), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 516 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2008), with Sundance,
Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., No. 02-73543, 2007 WL 37742, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 4,
2007) (finding delay in bringing suit weighed against a finding of irreparable harm).
78. See Everding, supra note 32, at 211 (citing Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The afterman
ofeBay v MercExchange, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006): A Review of Subsequent Judicial Decisions,
89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 631, 654-55 (2007), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=l 027687).
79. FTI Consulting analysis of relevant publicly available court cases (collecting cases
between May 15, 2006, through October 22, 2008, with 79.6% of 49 cases granted for
competitors (39 granted; 10 denied) and 33.3% of the 9 cases granted for NPE (3 granted; 6
denied) (unpublished report, on file with author).
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injunctive relief. The trend has continued but with some increasing
nuances.
In z4 Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. ,80 decided just a
month after eBay, the court denied an NPE an injunction, relying in
part on Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion. 81 A jury found that
Microsoft's Window and Office products infringed z4's patents
covering product activation software and that the infringement was
willful. 82 But when z4 moved for injunctive relief, the court held that
z4 failed to establish that a single one of the four factors weighed in
its favor. Specifically, the court held that z4 failed to establish either
irreparable harm or the inadequacy of money damages since z4 did
not compete in the marketplace with Microsoft and thus would not
suffer a loss of profits, brand name recognition, customer goodwill,
market share, or the ability to license the technology to others.83 The
court also relied on the fact that Microsoft incorporated the infringing
code into its products as a small component unrelated to the products'
core functionalities. 84 In balancing the private and public hardships,
the court found that any redesign of the software (only a few years
from being phased out completely) would be an enormously
expensive task for Microsoft and disabling the product activation
system could flood the market with pirated software, producing
incalculable losses for Microsoft and leaving the public without a
supply of widely used software and vulnerable to inferior pirated
85
copies.
An NPE experienced the same result in Paice, L.L.C. v. Toyota
Motor Corp.86 After winning a jury verdict of infringement, the court
refused to enjoin the sale of defendants' hybrid vehicles. The court
found no irreparable harm since Paice did not directly compete in the
market and had failed to demonstrate any lost ability to license its
hybrid engine technology.87 The court also found that damages were
adequate since the patent covered a small component of the overall
vehicle and Paice offered a license to Toyota during the post-trial
80. z4 Techs. v Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
81. Id. at 441.
82. Id. at 438-39.
83. ld. at 440-41.
84. Id. at 440.
85. Id. at 442-43.
86. Paice, LLC v Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-21I-DF, 2006 WL 2385139 (E.D.
Tex. Aug. 16, 2006), aff'd in part, 504 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
87. Id. at *4-5.
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period. 88 And finally, the balance of hardships favored the infringer
since an injunction would disrupt the business of downstream
supplies and dealers and could have an adverse effect on the hybrid
market and Toyota's reputation.89
In contrast, a practicing patentee received injunctive relief when
pitted against a market competitor who infringed a patent covering
digital video recorder (DVR) technology. The court in TiVo Inc. v.
EchoStar Communications Corp.90 found both irreparable harm and
an inadequate remedy at law based on the infringer's direct
competition with the patentee at a critical time in the nascent DVR
market. 91 The court also found that these same factors tipped the
balance of the hardships in the patentee's favor since DVRs were a
smaller part of the infringers' satellite transmission business.92 And
finally, the court held that the public would not be disserved by an
injunction given the public's interest in a strong patent system and
that the fact that any reduction in DVR availability impacts
entertainment and not public health or welfare. 93
Other practicing patentees have received similar treatment, with
courts sometimes using language that suggests a two-tier evaluation
of patents based on the entity whose patent rights have been
infringed. 94 For example, the court in Visto Corp. v. Seven Networks,
Inc.95  granted a permanent injunction against the patentee's
competitor in the mobile email market.96 In so doing, the court found
88. Id. at *5.
89. Id. at *6.
90. TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Commc'ns Corp., 446 F. Supp. 2d 664 (E.D. Tex. 2006), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 516 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
91. Id. at 669-70.
92. Id. at 670.
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Datascope Corp., 513 F. Supp. 2d 578, 586 (D. Md.
2007) (finding irreparable harm from loss of market share and concluding that "[i]f the Plaintiffs
do not obtain injunctive relief, others may be encouraged to infringe their patents and risk
litigation, thus devaluing the Plaintiffs' property"), rev'd on other grounds, 543 F.3d 1342 (Fed.
Cir. 2008); Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 502 F. Supp. 2d 477, 482 (W.D. Penn. 2007)
("If plaintiff cannot prevent its only competitor's continued infringement of its patent, the patent
is of little value."), rev'd on other grounds, 532 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also Verizon
Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2007); MGM Wells
Servs., Inc. v. Mega Lift Sys., LLC, 505 F. Supp. 2d 359, 378-80 (S.D. Tex. 2007); Litecubes,
L.L.C. v. N. Light Prods., Inc., No. 4:04CV00485 ERW, 2006 WL 5700252, at *10 (E.D. Mo.
Aug. 25, 2006); Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Synthes, 466 F. Supp. 2d 978, 982-85 (W.D. Tenn.
2006).
95. Visto Corp. v. Seven Networks, Inc., No. 2:03-CV-333-TJW, 2006 WL 3741891
(E.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2006).
96. Id.
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irreparable harm based on the direct market competition of the
parties, a factor that "weighs heavily in the court's analysis" since
"[i]ntellectual property enjoys its highest value when it is asserted
against a direct competitor in the plaintiffs market., 97 Similarly, the
Federal Circuit, in affirming the grant of a permanent injunction
against an infringing competitor, found that "[t]he essential attribute
of a patent grant is that it provides a right to exclude competitors from
infringing the patent.,
98
In contrast, NPEs have a more difficult time obtaining
injunctions. 99  For example, the district court again denied
MercExchange a permanent injunction on remand from the Supreme
Court, holding that MercExchange failed to establish irreparable
injury and an inadequate remedy at law given MercExchange's lack
of commercial activity in practicing the patent and pattern of seeking
only royalty revenue. 100 The court also considered MercExchange's
failure to seek a preliminary injunction, the suspect nature of its
business-method patent with claims twice rejected by the USPTO,'0 '
and the impact on eBay's large number of customers.10 2 In the court's
view, the case represented a patentee seeking to use its patent as a
sword to extract money and not a shield to protect its right to exclude
and guard its market share or reputation.1
0 3
Exceptions do, however, exist in both directions. More than a
few competitors have had courts deny their request for a permanent
injunction for a variety of reasons, including the absence of any risk
of continued infringement, 10 4 the lack of a nexus between the loss of
97. Id. at *4; see also 02 Micro Int'l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., No. 2-04-CV-
32 (TJW), 2007 WL 869576, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2007) ("This Court has recognized the
high value of intellectual property when it is asserted against a direct competitor in the
plaintiff's market."), vacated on other grounds by 521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
98. Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp., 551 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing 35
U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006)) (emphasis added).
99. See, e.g., Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008); MercExchange,
L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556 (E.D. Va. 2007); Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group,
Inc., No. 1:05-CV-264, 2006 WL 2709206 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 2006).
100. MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. at 569-71, 578, 582.
101. Id. at 573-74.
102. Id. at 585, 587.
103. Id. at 572.
104. See, e.g., Nichia Corp. v. Seoul Semiconductor, Ltd., No. 06-0162 MMC, 2008 WL
346416, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2008) (finding no irreparable harm when the evidence showed
no likelihood of continued infringement since the defendants no longer manufactured the
product, their only potential customer resided outside the United States, and the technology had
become obsolete); Respironics, Inc. v. Invacare Corp., No. 04-0336, 2008 WL 111983, at *5-6
(W.D. Penn. Jan. 8, 2008) (finding no irreparable harm or inadequate remedy at law when there
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market share and the infringing sales in a multiplayer market,105 a
willingness to license,' 0 6 the failure to join the exclusive licensee as a
party,107 unclean hands,10 8 and the seeming failure of the patentee topartyet
provide any evidence of the injury.'0 9 The Federal Circuit also
vacated an injunction awarded to a competitor when the jury's
damage award included both an up-front market entry payment and an
ongoing royalty that covered future sales, concluding that "[w]hen a
patentee requests and receives such compensation, it cannot be heard
to complain that it will be irreparably harmed by future sales."" 0 And
finally, in at least two cases, although involving the same parties, the
courts found the public interest in promoting a variety of medical
devices in the marketplace supported denying the patentee a
permanent injunction, even noting the preference of physicians for the
infringing product." '
On the other side, one NPE, a scientific research organization,
succeeded in obtaining an injunction based on harm to its ability (1)
to license the technology to finance its research and development and
(2) to compete in the marketplace for scientific talent for its research
and development programs." 2 The court concluded that because the
work of research institutions contributes fundamentally to scientific
advancement, these types of NPEs merit strong patent protection."
13
Seizing on this decision, at least one highly-litigious patent holding
company has sought to recast itself as a research and development
was no risk of future infringement by a model at a trade show that was destroyed and never
marketed).
105. See Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic Vascular, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 2d
554, 559-60 (D. Del. 2008) [hereinafter Advanced Cardiovascular 1]; Sundance, Inc. v.
DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., No. 02-73543, 2007 WL 37742, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 4, 2007).
106. See Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., No. C95-03577-DLJ,
2008 WL 4647384, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2008) [hereinafter Advanced Cardiovascular 11];
Advanced Cardiovascular 1, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 560; IMX, Inc. v. LendingTree, LLC, 469 F.
Supp. 2d 203, 225 (D. Del. 2007); Sundance, 2007 WL 37742, at *2. But see Acumed LLC v.
Stryker Corp., 551 F.3d 1323, 1328-29 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
107. See Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. CIV-03-1512-L, 2006 WL 2570614, at *5 (W.D. Okla.
Sept. 5, 2006).
108. See Avid Identification Sys., Inc. v. Phillips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., No. 2:04-CV-183,
2008 WL 819962, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2008).
109. See ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 533 F. Supp. 2d 397, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2008);
Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 2d 440, 444 (D. Del. 2007).
110. Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
111. Advanced Cardiovascular 1H, 2008 WL 4647384, at * 11; Advanced Cardiovascular I,
579 F. Supp. 2d at 561.
112. Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 492 F. Supp.
2d 600, 604 (E.D. Tex. 2007).
113. Id. at 608.
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company. 14 In this way, NPEs might establish irreparable harm, the
most difficult prong for an NPE, and fight the battle on willingness to
license, a prong that has gone against not only NPEs, but also some
competitors. 115
The post-eBay opinions reveal a strong correlation between
competition between the parties and injunctive relief, and the
likelihood of an injunction is especially high for patentees who
compete head-to-head with the infringer in a two-party market. 116 The
NPEs who seek licensing revenue have, in contrast, largely been
denied such relief. The right to exclude has therefore come to equal
the right to prevent another from intruding on a patentee's narrowly-
defined market share, creating a two-tiered valuation for patents based
on the identity of the patentee. 17 The first tier of patentees who
compete with the infringers are granted injunctive relief. The second
tier of patentees, in contrast, are mainly granted damages that are for
practical purposes calculated in the absence of the threat of an
injunction-essentially a compulsory license, discussed in Section IV.
III. KYOCERA V. U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION
Because the eBay decision decreased the likelihood of obtaining
a permanent injunction in district court, patentees have expressed a
heightened interest in pursuing patent infringement claims in an
alternative forum known to award injunctions upon finding
infringement-the International Trade Commission (ITC). In fact, the
only remedy that the ITC is authorized to grant is an injunction,
known as an exclusion order; it does not have the authority to award
damages." 8 More importantly, the ITC's ability to grant an exclusion
order, unlike a district court's ability to issue an injunction, is not
impacted by the eBay decision." 19 Thus, patentees have flocked to the
114. See George M. Newcombe et al., Prospective Relief for Patent Infringement in a
Post-eBay World, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 549, 565-66 (2008) (describing Wi-LAN Inc., which
characterizes its business strategy not only as licensing companies that use its patented
technology, but also as strengthening its portfolio through active research and development).
115. See supra text accompanying note 106.
116. See Advanced Cardiovascular 1, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 558-60; Sundance, Inc. v.
DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., No. 02-73543, 2007 WL 37742, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 4, 2007).
117. Douglas Ellis et al., The Economic Implications (and Uncertainties) of Obtaining
Permanent Injunctive Relief After eBay v. MercExchange, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 437, 442 (2008)
("[T]he real effect of eBay.. . is a reduced likelihood that certain types of patent holders will be
able to obtain an injunction.").
118. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2000).
119. Certain Baseband Processor Chips and Chipsets, Transmitter & Receiver (Radio)
Chips, Power Control Chips, and Products Containing Same, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-543,
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ITC. 120 But a recent decision by the Federal Circuit may stem that
tide. In Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. International Trade
Commission,121 the Federal Circuit limited the ability of patentees to
exclude downstream products containing infringing articles when the
patentee does not name the downstream manufacturers as respondents
to the investigation.
122
A. Historical Reach of In Rem Limited and General Exclusion
Orders
The ITC is a quasi-judicial agency delegated authority by
Congress to enforce a variety of U.S. international trade laws,
including Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 as amended, 19
U.S.C. § 1337. Section 337 authorizes the ITC to conduct
investigations into allegations of unfair practices in import trade.1
2 3
This includes patent infringement,124 which makes up the vast
majority-over 90%-of its enforcement actions. 125 In order for
patentees to succeed in an ITC investigation, they must establish
infringement of a valid patent, a domestic industry for the patented
product, and infringement by an imported product. 126 And unlike
district courts, which can maintain personal jurisdiction only over
2007 ITC LEXIS 621, Comm'n Op., 62-63 n.230 (June 19, 2007). Patentees have a 100%
injunction rate upon a finding by the Commission of a violation. Colleen V. Chien, Patently
Protectionist? An Empirical Analysis of Patent Cases at the International Trade Commission,
50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 63, 99 (2008).
120. ITC investigations have more than doubled since 1997, and the number of Section
337 patent infringement proceedings has risen 25% from 2006 to 2007. ANALYSIS GROUP,
PATENT LITIGATION BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION 1,
http://www.analysisgroup.com/uploadedFiles/Practice-Areas/Patent-Litigation Before the IT
C.pdf.
121. Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 545 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
122. Id. at 1358-59.
123. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2000); In re Certain Baseband Processor Chips and Chipsets,
USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-543, 2007 ITC LEXIS 621, Comm'n Op., at 1.
124. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(l)(B)(i) (2000).
125. G. Brian Busey, An Introduction to Section 337 and the U.S. International Trade
Commission, 949 PRAC. L. INST.: PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS & LITERARY
PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 11, 13, 35 (2008) (asserting that the statute is, however,
broad enough to encompass many other claims of unfair competition including misappropriation
of trade secrets, passing off, gray market goods, false advertising, violations of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, and antitrust violations).
126. Steven D. Henminger, Section 337 of the Tariff Act: Global IP Protection in our
Global Economy?, 19 INTEL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., April 2007, at 1, 2; Peter B. Martine,
Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights at the US. International Trade Commission,
http://mpiplaw.com/enforcement_article.cfm (last visited Jan. 6, 2009).
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defendants who have minimum contacts with the forum, 127 pursuant
to Section 337, the ITC has both in personam jurisdiction and
jurisdiction over the "article.' ' 128 Thus, the ITC has jurisdiction over
an infringing product imported into the United States even if the
manufacturer or seller of the product does not have a presence in the
United States (preventing in personam jurisdiction).1 29 This in rem
jurisdiction provides patentees facing foreign and domestic infringers
that import products from overseas, including many companies in the
electronics, chemical, and general manufacturing industries, with an
alternative forum for protecting their patent right to exclude through
injunctive relief.
The ITC has the power to issue exclusion orders that instruct the
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (Customs) to exclude from the
United States articles found to violate the statute. 130 Section 1337(d)
provides for two types of exclusion orders: limited exclusion orders
(LEOs) and general exclusion orders (GEOs). A LEO covers the
products of a named respondent found by the Commission to be in
violation of the statute."' A GEO, in contrast, may extend to any
infringing products, regardless of their source, if a patentee can show
either (1) that such a general remedy is necessary to prevent
circumvention of a LEO or (2) that there exists a pattern of violation,
but the source of the infringing products is not easily identifiable.1
3 2
The Commission, however, has slowly extended the scope of
LEOs to reach not only the infringing article itself, but also
downstream products that contain the infringing article. In Certain
Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory,133 the ITC introduced
what have come to be known as the EPROM factors. 134 The
Commission, seeking to balance patentees' need for effective relief
against the burden on third parties and the public, set forth nine non-
exclusive factors to consider in fashioning the exclusion of
downstream products for a LEO. The enumerated factors include:
127. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318-20 (1945).
128. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2000).
129. Id.
130. Id. at § 1337(d).
131. Id. at § 1337(d)(1).
132. Id. at § 1337(d)(2).
133. Certain Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memories, Components Thereof, Prods.
Containing Such Memories, & Processes for Making Such Memories, USITC Pub. No. 2196,
Inv. No. 337-TA-276, Comm'n Op. (Mar. 16, 1989) (EPROM Order), affd sub nom, Hyundai
Elecs. Indus. Co. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 899 F.2d 1204, 1209-10 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
134. Id.
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[1.] the value of the infringing articles compared to the value of the
downstream products in which they are incorporated, [2.] the
identity of the manufacturer of the downstream products (i.e., are
the downstream products manufactured by the party found to have
committed the unfair act, or by third parties), [3.] the incremental
value to complainant of the exclusion of downstream products, [4.]
the incremental detriment to respondents of such exclusion, [5.] the
burdens imposed on third parties resulting from exclusion of
downstream products, [6.] the availability of alternative
downstream products which do not contain the infringing articles,
[7.] the likelihood that imported downstream products actually
contain the infringing articles and are thereby subject to exclusion,
[8.] the opportunity for evasion of an exclusion order which does
not include downstream products, [and 9.] the enforceability of an
order by Customs.... 135
In the EPROM decision, the Commission concluded that to
provide the complainant, Intel, with an effective remedy, the LEO
must be tailored to reach not only infringing EPROMs but also
downstream products containing the EPROMs manufactured by
respondent Hyundai.136 The Commission found that both the ease of
circumventing the LEO and the vital nature of the infringing read-
only memory to the downstream product favored the exclusion. 137 But
the Commission also concluded that the LEO should not extend to
products of non-respondents, not only because Intel had not requested
such an exclusion, but also because the incremental benefit to Intel
appeared small compared to the burden on non-respondents of having
to comply with the order. 138 The Federal Circuit affirmed, upholding
the order as not arbitrary or capricious, but as a reasonable means of
ensuring an effective remedy given the Commission's findings that
infringing memory could be incorporated into Hyundai's downstream
products and that Hyundai had violated Section 337. 139 Some
interpreted both the ITC and the Federal Circuit's opinions as
disapproving of LEOs that cover the downstream products of non-
respondents. 1
40
135. Id. at 125.
136. See id. at 126; see also Hyundai, 899 F.2d at 1209.
137. Certain Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memories, at 125-27.
138. Id. at 127.
139. Hyundai, 899 F.2d at 1209.
140. See, e.g., Bryan A. Schwartz, Remedy and Bonding Law Under Section 337: A
Primer for the Patent Litigator, 8 FED. CIR. B.J., 1999, at 121, 137.
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Yet, only a few years later, the ITC took the next step in Certain
Integrated Circuit Telecommunication Chips14 1 and extended a LEO
to the downstream products of a non-respondent. 42 In opposing the
exclusion order, the respondent argued that such an extension
amounted to granting the complainant a GEO without the
complainant having established either a pattern of violation or
likelihood of circumvention. 143  The Commission disagreed,
distinguishing a GEO as prohibiting the importation of infringing
articles regardless of their manufacturer, while the LEO at issue
prohibited importation of downstream products containing only
respondent HMC's chips. 144 It noted that, under EPROM, the failure
to name the manufacturer of the downstream products receives weight
in tailoring a LEO, but concluded that it would be inequitable to
deprive the patentee of effective relief merely because of a failure to
name as respondents all manufacturers of downstream products. 1
45
The ITC continued to extend LEOs to cover the downstream
products of non-respondents when the products contained a
respondent's infringing article. In Certain Display Controllers,14 6 for
example, the Commission weighed the EPROM factors and issued a
LEO covering not only the infringing display controllers, but also all
circuit boards and LCD monitors that contained such controllers,
regardless of the manufacturer. 147 The Commission found that the
second EPROM factor-the identity of the manufacturer of the
downstream product-weighed against the exclusion but did not
preclude it because virtually all the infringing controllers entered the
141. Certain Integrated Circuit Telecomm. Chips & Prods. Containing Same Including
Dialing Apparatus, USITC Pub. 2670, Inv. No. 337-TA-337, 1993 WL 13033517, Comm'n Op.
(Aug. 3, 1993).
142. Id. at 32. Pre-EPROM, the ITC had extended a LEO to downstream products of non-
respondents. Certain Dynamic Random Access Memories, Components Thereof & Prods.,
USITC Pub. 2034, Inv. No. 337-TA-242, Comn'n Op., 90 (Nov. 1987). But on review, the
President disapproved the order. Schwartz, supra note 140, at 138. In Certain Integrated Circuit
Telecomm. Chips, the Commission noted that it was "mindful" that such a LEO had been the
basis of Presidential disapproval but did not find that it barred the LEO in the case before it.
Certain Integrated Circuit Telecomm. Chips, USITC Pub. 2034, Inv. No. 337-TA-242, 1993
WL 13033517, Comm'n Op., at 32.
143. Certain Integrated Circuit Telecomm. Chips, USITC Pub. 2034, Inv. No. 337-TA-
242, 1993 WL 13033517, Comm'n Op., at 26.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 27-28.
146. Certain Display Controllers & Prods. Containing Same consol with Certain Display
Controllers With Upscaling Functionality & Prods. Containing Same, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-
481 & Inv. No. 337-TA-491, 2005 WL 996252, (Feb. 4,2005).
147. Id.
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U.S. as part of a monitor product. 148 And under the eighth EPROM
factor-the opportunity for evasion of an exclusion order that does not
include the downstream products-the Commission concluded that the
complainant would not be afforded effective relief without the
exclusion. 149 And again in Certain Electrical Connectors,150 the
Commission issued a LEO covering the downstream products of non-
respondents' that contain the respondents' infringing electrical
connector.' 5' The Commission again found that since the infringing
connectors were imported only in the downstream products, their
exclusion was necessary to fashion an effective remedy. 1
52
The ITC thus gave patentees access to a broad injunctive remedy
against not only infringing articles, but also the products in which
they were ultimately imported. This broad remedy, just like the near
automatic grant of injunctive relief in district courts pre-eBay, was
recently brought to an end. In Kyocera v. International Trade
Commission,153 the Federal Circuit rejected the ITC's interpretation of
its statutory authority to include extending LEOs to the products of
parties that had not been named as respondents to the investigation.
54
B. Kyocera: Limiting Limited Exclusion Orders
The Commission's remedy decision in Certain Baseband
Processor Chips simply mirrored its earlier decisions. 55 On June 21,
2005, the Commission instituted an investigation under Section 337
based on a complaint by Broadcom Corp. (Broadcom) for patent
infringement in the importation of, inter alia, certain baseband
processor chips and chipsets, and products containing the chips,
including cellular telephone handsets.156  Broadcom named
Qualcomm, the chip manufacture, as the sole respondent.
During the violation stage, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
determined that Qualcomm infringed numerous claims of one of
148. Id. at § IV(A).
149. Id.
150. Certain Electrical Connectors & Prods. Containing Same, USITC Pub. 2981, Inv. No.
337-TA-374, 1996 WL 1056313 Comm'n Op. (July 1996).
151. Id. at 11-15.
152. Id.
153. Kyocera v. int'l Trade Comm'n, 545 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
154. Id. at 1358-59.
155. Certain Baseband Processor Chips & Chipsets, Transmitter & Receiver (Radio)
Chips, Power Control Chips, & Prods. Containing Same, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-543, 2007
ITC LEXIs 621 Comm'n Op. (June 19, 2007).
156. Id. at 2.
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several asserted patents. 157 While not recommending the exclusion of
downstream products, 158 the ALJ did reject Qualcomm's argument
that such an exclusion fell outside the Commission's authority under
Section 337(d)(1). 159 The Commission then held a public hearing on
remedies on March 21-22, 2007, in which six interveners joined. 160
As in its earlier opinions, the Commission analyzed the EPROM
factors and issued a LEO prohibiting the unlicensed entry not only of
infringing baseband processor chips but also new models of wireless
communication devices containing Qualcomm's infringing chips. 161
Unsurprisingly, the Commission found that the exclusion of the
downstream communications devices was necessary to give
Broadcom an effective remedy in light of the fact that virtually all of
Qualcomm's infringing chips entered the United States as part of such
devices. 162 It also concluded that, although Qualcomm did not
manufacture the downstream products, that alone did not preclude
relief and did not even warrant special weight. 163 While noting the
importance of encouraging complainants to name all potential
respondents, the Commission refused to find that the failure to do so
automatically precluded a remedy against downstream third parties,
164
and rejected the claim that Broadcom's failure was an attempt to
mislead Qualcomm and third-party manufactures as to the scope of
the investigation and remedy requested.
165
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed. 166 The Court of Appeals
held that the ITC has no statutory authority to issue a LEO against the
downstream products of non-respondents. 67 The court found that the
plain language of Section 1337(d) created two distinct forms of
exclusion orders: one limited to persons determined by the
Commission to be violating the statute (a LEO) and one general to
articles encompassing the violation when the complainant
demonstrates either that such a remedy is necessary to prevent
157. Id. at 9.
158. Id. at 3, 18.
159. Id. at 39.
160. Id. at 3-4.
161. Id. at 124 (determining that the burden on third parties and the public warranted
grandfathering in devices imported for sale to the public on or before the date of its exclusion
order).
162. Id. at 12, 62.
163. Id. at 37, 43, 47-48.
164. Id. at 50.
165. Id. at 50-51.
166. Kyocera v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
167. Id.
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circumvention or that there exists a pattern of violations (a GEO). 168
As such, the court held that Section 1337 "on its face" limited LEOs
to named respondents and that the ITC does not have the authority to
expand LEOs from "'persons determined by the Commission to be
violating' [this section] to 'articles manufactured by persons
determined by the Commission to be violating this section.""'5 69 To
read these words into the statute, the Federal Circuit concluded,
would make other sections superfluous.
170
To exclude downstream products of non-respondents, the
complainant must satisfy the heightened evidentiary requirement of a
GEO.' 71 In so holding, the Federal Circuit rejected Broadcom and the
Commission's argument that such an interpretation impermissibly
converted the ITC's in rem jurisdiction over infringing articles to an
in personam remedy. The court replied that this argument ignored the
Act's plain constraint on the Commission's authority under Section
1337(d)(2) to "persons determined by the Commission to be violating
this section," thus incorporating an in personam element.' 72 The Court
also expressed little sympathy for Broadcom's lack of an effective
remedy without an exclusion order covering downstream products,
noting that Broadcom made a strategic choice not to seek a GEO and
not to name even a single downstream importer of Qualcomm's chips
despite knowing their identities. 1
73
C. Impact of Kyocera: To Name or Not to Name
The fallout from Kyocera has just begun. Only weeks after the
Federal Circuit's Kyocera decision, two respondents of concluded
Section 337 investigations filed petitions to modify issued LEOs
covering the downstream products of non-respondents containing
their infringing articles. On October 27, 2008, respondent System
General (SG) filed the first petition. 174 On August 11, 2006, the
Commission had issued a LEO excluding from entry into the United
States not only respondent SG's infringing pulse width modulation
(PWM) chips, but also any downstream products containing the
infringing chips, including LCD computer monitors, AC printer
168. Id. at 1356.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1356-57.
172. Id. at 1357.
173. Id.
174. Certain Power Supply Controllers & Prods. Containing Same, USITC Inv. No. 337-
TA-54 1, Petition for Modification of Limited Exclusion Order, 2 (filed Oct. 27, 2008).
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adapters, and circuit boards.175 SC's petition asks the Commission to
modify the LEO to avoid encompassing products of non-
respondents. 7 6 The Commission granted SG's request and narrowed
its LEO. 177 On October 28, 2008, Epistar Corp. filed a similar petition
seeking modification or rescission of a LEO covering circuit boards
containing infringing LEDs manufactured by non-respondents.
78
Interestingly, the complainant, Philips Lumileds Lighting Co.,
submitted a cross-petition arguing that the LEO should be converted
to a GEO. 79
Incoming complaints show the effects of Kyocera. For example,
on November 17, 2008, Spansion filed a complaint alleging the
unlawful importation of certain Samsung flash memory chips and
downstream products containing these chips. 80 Despite naming ten
downstream manufacturers in addition to Samsung and its
affiliates,' 8' Spansion specifically requested a GEO and alleged a
pattern of unauthorized use, difficulty in identifying all sources, and
ease in circumvention of a limited order.' 82 At least two other
complainants have also specifically requested a GEO to reach
downstream products. 83 Thus, the trend is for ITC complainants to
seek virtually the same scope of relief that would have been sought
pre-Kyocera by requesting a LEO.
The heightened evidentiary standards for a GEO will, however,
leave many patentees without an effective remedy against
downstream products. As described above, obtaining a GEO requires
a patentee to show what the Federal Circuit has called "exceptional
circumstances," a pattern of violation by sources difficult to identify
175. Id. at 1-2.
176. Id. at 3-4.
177. Certain Power Supply Controllers & Prods. Containing Same, USITC Inv. No. 337-
TA-541 (filed Mar. 5, 2009).
178. Certain High-Brightness Light Emitting Diodes & Prods. Containing the Same,
USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-556, Petition to Rescind or Modify Limited Exclusion Order, 2 (filed
Oct. 28, 2008).
179. See Certain High-Brightness Light Emitting Diodes & Prods. Containing the Same,
USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-556, Office of Unfair Import Investigation's Response to Cross-
Petition to Modify Limited Exclusion Order (Nov. 19, 2008).
180. Certain Flash Memory Chips & Prods. Containing the Same, USITC Pub. No. 2640,
Complaint at 1 (Nov. 17, 2008).
181. Id. at 5-18.
182. Id. at 36-39.
183. See Certain Active Comfort Footwear, USITC Inv. No. 377-TA-660, Complaint at 16
(Oct. 22, 2008); Certain Semiconductor Integrated Circuits & Prods. Containing the Same,
USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-665, Complaint at 39 (Nov. 20, 2008).
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or the ease of circumventing a LEO.184 Broadcom would appear to fail
this standard. First, the record indicates that Broadcom knew the
identity of the downstream manufacturers, 85 but because some were
its customers or potential customers, good business sense dictated not
naming them in the investigation. Second, the Commission's
conclusion that the eighth EPROM factor-the opportunity for
circumvention of a LEO without inclusion of downstream products-
was inapplicable when all infringing chips were imported in
downstream products could also hold for GEOs.
But the remaining remedy, a LEO naming all downstream
manufacturers as respondents, poses more than a few difficulties.
First, it increases both the need and the extent of pre-filing discovery
so as to ensure inclusion of all downstream manufacturers since the
fast-paced ITC proceedings leave little time to amend a complaint
post-filing. Such an investigation can be difficult even when the
infringing devices remain unaltered within the downstream product.
Second, it can lead to a long list of respondents, increasing the
complexity and expense of the litigation. And finally, it can also leave
a patentee without representation if conflicts among law firms cannot
be resolved.
Leaving this morass as the only option for patentees who face
importation of infringing articles within downstream products runs
counter to the policy behind the ITC's in rem jurisdiction over
imports. Over the past ten years and out of 227 completed
investigations, the Commission has issued only 19 GEOs compared to
43 LEOs. 18 6 This is consistent with the ITC's recognition that a GEO
represents a significant restraint on international trade.' 87 Because
Kyocera limits the ITC's ability to exclude infringing products upon a
finding of infringement, just as eBay severely limited a district court's
ability to issue a permanent injunction, patentees likely have lost a
good deal of leverage in licensing negotiations.
For those patentees who can satisfy the heightened evidentiary
requirements for a GEO, or are able to jump the considerable hurdles
and name as respondents all the manufacturers, distributors, and
184. Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1356 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
185. Id. at 1357.
186. USITC Year in Trade 1997-2007, Tables A- 10.
187. Certain Erasable Programmable Read Only Memories, Components Thereof, Prods.
Containing Such Memories, & Processes for Making Such Memories, USITC Pub. No. 2196,
Inv. No. 337-TA-276, Comm'n Op., 121 (Mar. 16, 1989) (EPROM Order), affd sub nom,
Hyundai Elecs. Indus. Co. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 899 F.2d 1204, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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sellers of not only an infringing device but also its downstream
products, once the Commission finds a Section 337 violation,
injunctive relief is nearly automatic. In contrast, for those patentees
like Broadcom that know the identity of the downstream
manufacturers, but do not wish to tarnish relations by naming their
own customers or potential customers as respondents, the ITC no
longer offers as inviting of a forum as it did prior to Kyocera.
IV. REMEDIES RESTRUCTURED
A. No Injunction Equals a Compulsory License
Neither the Supreme Court in eBay nor the Federal Circuit in
Kyocera specifically addressed what the appropriate prospective
remedy should be when a patentee proves infringement but is
nonetheless denied a permanent injunction. Yet both decisions have
created the specter that the U.S. patent system is essentially adopting
a compulsory licensing approach. Because Kyocera raises the
obstacles for certain patentees to file in the ITC, such patentees will
likely look to bring an action only in district court and thus be subject
to eBay's restrictions on injunctions. When the patentee cannot meet
the eBay factors despite establishing infringement, district courts
cannot award prospective relief outside of a running royalty rate on
future infringement.
88
The result is a compulsory license that allows a non-patentee to
practice a patent without the patentee's authorization. Congress has,
however, repeatedly refused to adopt a compulsory license scheme for
patents. 1
89
Member nations of the World Trade Organization have agreed
that if they implement laws concerning compulsory licenses, such
laws will be consistent with Article 31 of the Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement. Article 31
provides that if a member nation's laws allow for the use of a patent
without the authorization of the patent holder, including use by the
government or third parties authorized by the government, the
provisions governing such a compulsory license should include that:
188. See Paice L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Voda
v. Cordis Corp., No. CIV-03-1512-L, 2006 WL 2570614, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 5, 2006); z4
Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 441,444 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
189. See Hand, supra note 72, at 469. The Supreme Court and Federal Circuit have also
rejected the notion of reading a compulsory license requirement into the Patent Act. See, e.g.,
Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm and Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980); Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott
Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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(i) prior to the grant of a compulsory license, the proposed user made
efforts to obtain authorization from the patent holder on "reasonable
commercial terms and conditions" and that such efforts were not
successful within a "reasonable period of time"; (ii) if a national
emergency arises, the requirement to make an effort to license the
patent prior to obtaining a compulsory license may be waived; (iii)
any compulsory license is not exclusive; (iv) a compulsory license is
not assignable; (v) authorization of use will be limited to
predominantly supplying the domestic market; and (vi) a patent
holder will be paid "adequate remuneration."' 90
Despite Congress's refusal to enact legislation on compulsory
licenses, the courts seem to have already allowed them. For instance,
in Innogenetics N. V. v. Abbott Laboratories, the Federal Circuit
remanded the issue of determining the proper prospective running
royalty where a request for an injunction was denied, bluntly
characterizing the running royalty as "a compulsory license."' 19 1 As
another example in Paice, the Federal Circuit approved the use of
prospective royalties, attempting to frame them as ongoing rather than
compulsory licenses. 92 The Court has, however, noted that in most
cases the courts should allow the parties to attempt to negotiate a
license themselves. 193 And when not possible, the court should take
additional evidence in determining such a rate given the change in the
parties' bargaining positions and the different economic factors
involved once the uncertainty of liability and patent validity are
190. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 33 I.L.M. 1197,
at art. 31 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/27-trips.pdf.
191. Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
192. SeePaice,504F.3dat 1315.
193. See id. at n. 15. In Paice, the Federal Circuit attempted to frame this prospective relief
as an ongoing royalty as opposed to a compulsory license, defining the latter as one in which all
who meet a certain criteria must be given a license. 504 F.3d at 1313 n.13. Judge Rader's
concurrence, however, seems to best the argument in making the distinction between a rate
reached by the parties through negotiations-an ongoing royalty-versus one imposed by the
court without permission-a compulsory license. Judge Rader would have mandated a remand
to the parties who he believes are better suited to arrive at a fair and efficient rate, and he would
have resorted to judicial intervention only should such negotiations fail. 504 F.3d at 1316-17
(Radar, J., concurring). Allowing the parties to negotiate leaves open the possibility of other
resolution. For example, MercExchange and eBay settled their battle with eBay buying the
patents, a remedy which the court would not have ordered. Michael C. Brandt, Compulsory
Licenses in the Aftermath of eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.: The Courts' Authority to
Impose Prospective Compensatory Relief for Patent Infringement, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 699, 712
(2008).
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determined. 194 While this could become the standard practice going
forward, 195 the Federal Circuit has not given any guidance in the
particular economic factors that a court should consider post-
judgment or how the uncertainty of the patented technology's value in
the future should affect the hypothetical negotiations for setting
royalty rates. 96 An alternative approach that has emerged, however, is
having the jury assess a future royalty during trial.' 97
Deprived of the leverage of an injunction, certain patents have
been devalued based solely on the identity of their owner. This value
cannot be compensated by considerations of the changed bargaining
position and altered economic factors in establishing a royalty rate
post-judgment. While many have expressed their concern about
patent thickets and hold-ups making downstream development more
expensive and allowing some patentees to claim inflated values for
their patents, 98 one may question whether grouping patentees into
practicing versus non-practicing entities or direct versus indirect
competitors attacks this problem. Also, the concern with bad patents
issuing from an overburdened USPTO has more to do with the value
of those individual patents than it does with the entity that claims
ownership to them.
B. Lost Remedy Equals Lost Value
Patents have long been equated with the right to exclude. The
U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress "[t]o promote the [p]rogress of
[s]cience and useful [a]rts, by securing for limited [t]imes to [a]uthors
and [i]nventors the exclusive [r]ight to their respective [w]ritings and
[d]iscoveries."' 199 The Patent Act gives patents the attributes of
194. See Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Paice, 504
F.3d at 1315.
195. See Boston Scientific Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, No. C 02-00790 SI, 2009 WL
975424 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2008).
196. See generally Christian Tregillis, Awards for Future Damages in Patent Infringement
Cases after eBay v. MercExchange, 24 INTELL. PROP. L. NEWSL., Summer 2006, at 4. At least
one court has concluded that the date of the hypothetical negotiations is the date of the verdict
rather than the date of first infringement. Boston Scientific, 2008 WL 5054955, at * 1.
197. A July 9, 2008, order by Judge Ron Clark from the Eastern District of Texas
indicated that juries may take up the question of future damages for on-going violations of a
patent. Ariba, Inc. v. Emptoris, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 2d 914, 916 (E.D. Tex. 2008). The Federal
Circuit appears to have approved this approach. See Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512
F.3d 1363, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
198. See, e.g., Mark Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX.
L. REv. 1991, 2010, 2013 (2007).
199. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
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personal property,2 °0 including "the right to exclude others from
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention. 2 0° In
exchange, the patentee must meet the statutory disclosure
requirements,20 2 but there is no requirement that a patentee actually
practice the invention, as long recognized by the Supreme Court.20 3
The Federal Circuit focused on the right to exclude in
formulating its pre-eBay general rule favoring injunctions. 204 The
court concluded that "it is contrary to the laws of property, of which
the patent law partakes, to deny the patentee's right to exclude others
from use of his property., 20 5 The Federal Circuit also recognized that
this right gives value to a patent.20 6 The court viewed this not as a
drain on society, however, but as part of the value given to patentees
in exchange for disclosing their invention and necessary to spur
innovation generally. Specifically, the court stated that without the
power of an injunction,
the express purpose of the Constitution and Congress, to promote
the progress of the useful arts, would be seriously undermined ....
[and] the right to exclude granted to the patentee would have only
a fraction of the value it was intended to have, and would no longer
be as great an incentive to engage in the toils of scientific and
technological research.
20 7
The court is not alone in expressing this view. Renowned jurist
Joseph Story also noted that without injunctive relief to secure rights
to patents, the inventor could be ruined by the need for constant
litigation.20 8
200. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006).
201. Id. at § 154(a)(1).
202. Id. at § 112.
203. See Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 410 (1908).
204. See, e.g., Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246-47 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
205. Id.
206. Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1577-78 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
207. Id.
208. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE As ADMINISTERED IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA 236 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 13th ed. 1886) ("It is quite plain that if
no other remedy could be given in cases of patents and copyrights than an action at law for
damages, the inventor or author might be ruined by the necessity of perpetual litigation, without
ever being able to have a final establishment of his rights."). Other authors have since
commented on the affect constant litigation would have on an inventor. See, e.g., Paul M.
Mersino, Patents, Trolls, and Personal Property: Will eBay Auction Away a Patent Holder's
Right to Exclude?, 6 AvE MARIA L. REv. 307, 310 (2007); Benjamin H. Diessel, Trolling for
Trolls: The Pitfalls of the Emerging Market Competition Requirement for Permanent
Injunctions in Patent Cases Post-eBay, 106 MICH. L. REv. 305, 334 (2007).
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The new uncertainty introduced into every patentee's right to
exclude by eBay and the practical impact on choice of forum resulting
from Kyocera can be expected to have exactly the opposite effect on
innovation. Replacing an injunction with the equitable remedy of an
ongoing license 20 9 diminishes patent values for practicing and non-
practicing patentees alike by reducing pre-litigation and pre-judgment
settlement values, reducing the value of exclusive licenses, and
increasing litigation costs.
While NPEs clearly rest on the bottom rung of the patentee
ladder, right next to them sit small inventors and start-up businesses.
While the "troll" hunt of recent years has condemned NPEs as a leech
on market participants,21 ° others have argued persuasively that such
entities provide a market for inventions without which many
inventors and small businesses would be left with few resources to
enforce their patent rights (especially against large companies) and
thus unable to realize the future value of their inventions.2 1
Moreover, NPEs often have been, or are attempting to become,
market players. Small businesses contribute much to innovation and
have more patents per employee than large companies, but without
the threat of an injunction, large companies have very little incentive
to bargain since the worst they face for just stealing the invention is
writing a check.212 One small inventor sees the eBay decision as a
potential death-knell to his kind. Pre-eBay, this inventor came head-
to-head with behemoth Microsoft only to have his once successful
software company reduced to NPE status.2 13 But with the threat of an
injunction, he managed to get Microsoft to settle for a $60 million
license.214 Under the post-eBay regime such settlement prospects look
209. In response to arguments that the Patent Act does not authorize future damage
awards, the courts have interpreted the ongoing royalty as an equitable remedy. See Boston
Scientific Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, No. C 02-0790 SI, 2008 WL 5054955, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 25, 2008) (citing Paice L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1314 (Fed. Cir.
2007)).
210. Cf James F. McDonough III, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of
the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 193-95 (2006).
However, despite the amount of media attention focused on NTP, MercExchange, and other
NPEs, in the last five years such entities account for only about 2% of patent suits. Raymond P.
Niro, Wo is Really Undermining the Patent System-"Patent Trolls" or Congress?, 6 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 185, 186 (2007) (quoting Nathan Myhrvold, Inventors Have
Rights, Too!, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 2006, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114368437650611883.html).
211. Cf. McDonough, supra note 210, at 210.
212. See Seidenberg, supra note 46, at 52-53, 55.
213. Id. at 52-53.
214. Id. at 52.
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grim. In contrast, the value of an identical patent in the hands of a
large, established market player like Microsoft remains largely intact.
Yet such companies may find that their patent portfolios are not
entirely immune. Many companies license patents in areas in which
they do not actively compete, including giants such as IBM,
Honeywell, and Lucent.21 5 Also, the way the court defines the
relevant market can also leave practicing entities without injunctive
relief 2 16 Thus even market participants may find a decrease in the
value of their license revenues.
The risk that an exclusive license could be made non-exclusive
in the absence of injunctive relief also diminishes the licensing
revenues for patentees. In Voda v. Cordis Corp., the failure to join the
patentee's exclusive licensee as a party to the suit resulted in the loss
of that exclusivity when the patentee did not himself practice the
invention.21 7 The value of such exclusive relationships now depends
on the identity of the patentee and a licensee's willingness to aid in
the defense of the patent.
Finally, the loss of injunctive relief post-eBay and post-Kyocera
reduces incentives to settle either pre-litigation or pre-verdict,
increasing the number and duration of cases. The alleged infringer has
less incentive to settle against an NPE or non-competitor since the
worst outcome is being forced pay what was already owed. And the
larger the company, the more it can afford even willful infringement
damages, though the risk of such a finding has been reduced under the
Federal Circuit's new "objective recklessness" standard for
willfulness.2 18 Patentees also have less incentive to settle given that
settlement talks can demonstrate a willingness to take a license, a
factor that has weighed against patentees seeking an injunction.1 9
This has prompted some to propose ways to raise the value of
patents whose owners fail the test for injunctive relief. These include
215. Id. at 53.
216. See, e.g., Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic Vascular, Inc., 579 F.
Supp. 2d 554, 558-60 (D. Del. 2008) (Advanced Cardiovascular 1); Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte
Fabricating Ltd., No. 02-73543, 2007 WL 37742, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 4, 2007).
217. Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. CIV-03-1512-L, 2006 WL 2570614, at *5 (W.D. Okla.
Sept. 5, 2006).
218. In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
219. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., No. C95-03577-DLJ, 2008
WL 4647384, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2008) (Advanced Cardiovascular 11); Advanced
Cardiovascular!, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 560-61; IMX, Inc. v. LendingTree, L.L.C., 469 F. Supp. 2d
203, 225 (D. Del. 2007); Sundance, 2007 WL 37742, at *2.
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increasing the royalty rate when the court denies an injunction 220 by,
for example, treating ongoing infringement as willful and thus subject
to treble damages.2 While affording a patentee some increased
value, nothing comes close to the power to exclude through injunctive
relief.
V. CONCLUSION
The decrease in the ability for patentees to obtain injunctions in
both predominant forums for patent litigation, district courts, and the
ITC will likely result in patentees losing leverage in licensing and
settlement negotiations. As a result, this will likely have an impact on
damage awards because damage calculations are often based upon
what royalty rates patentees in the industry are able to obtain.222 Thus,
there is a real danger that eBay and Kyocera will have the long-term
effect of devaluing patents; the same result as if Congress had
introduced a compulsory license provision into the Patent Act.
220. Yixin H. Tang, The Future of Patent Enforcement after eBay v. MercExchange, 20
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 235, 250-51 (2006). While the Supreme Court compared the Patent Act to
the Copyright Act, the copyright statute allows damages equaling the profit of infringer. 17
U.S.C. § 504 (2006).
221. See Newcombe, supra note 114, at 576; Benjamin Petersen, Injunctive Relief in the
Post-eBay World, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 193, 194 (2008).
222. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp. 318 F.
Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
* * *
